By Nirina Mignon
To properly know a substance, it is evident that we must know its properties insofar as we may discern it from objects contrary to it, insofar as we make a statement of its presence: to say “This is what I speak of, rather than the other.” That is to say we must make discernment of the properties which underlie it (its haecceity) to make statements concerning it. For us to speak of something which we do not know of by properties demarks a hypostasis. Hence for instance, to admit a will one must also firstly indicate what properties indicate the effect or presence of the will, or else even by the law of non-excluded middle one makes no admission. Since, if we are not able to make a statement of the nature of an object or form, the predicables of the form which we make a syllogism of could easily be attributed to another form which indicates as much to the contrary. One can not say that man falls under the genus of animals, if the few properties which we know of the genus of animals are also identical to that of another genus, and there is no other property within the genus which we declared (of animals) which demonstrates an incongruity with the other; insofar as we can not say that man pertains to just as much of the genus of animals, as man pertains to the genus of plants. Essentially, it can be said that an accident is begot when a notion does not contain all the predicates for the attainment of the substance in itself, as Leibniz says (Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics”, Liber VIII.). It follows then also that it would not be wise beyond the realm of poetics to speak of a “Good” had we known nothing of its predicates, nor of the properties of a “Good”, for it would be involving in the realized world an undeclared variable which seems only to exist from an intuition. This intuition, although denoting an idea of the object, can easily fall into the category of things of the desire, which seem to make one of the “ought” and the “is”. It is evident that one being in a state which lacks reason due to its heightened sensuality can lack the discernment of properties. For instance, an individual being frightened to its most base faculty of seeking survival, or being enticed with other carnal volitions such as lust, has an impaired faculty of both reason and will, respectively which designates whether a prospect is good, better, or best, and whether to act upon this discernment. It is evident that Love is predicated on the potentiality of Good, which is predicated on nothing else but itself, and whose properties are known. By potentiality I speak of the inverse of actuality, that is to say the possible existence of the yet unfulfilled, which is mutually exclusive to actuality insofar as a substance can not be potential and yet realized but must either be potential or realized, as Aquinas asserts (Aquinas, “Commentary on Metaphysics”, Liber IX.). Or to compare, just as an atom can either have a vacancy in its electron pairing (rendering it a free radical), it can also have all its electrons paired and be stable; though it can not be both a free radical and a stable ion. And though the existence of a free radical enables the atom or ion to perform an electron pairing with another particle, it loses the property of being a free radical upon the actualization of a stable pairing; meaning its energy potentiality was realized and thus diminished, just as a potential act can be actualized and lose its potentiality and become converted to act.
Principally, an example of a successful trial of this methodology of property discernment can be found in the manner which we have declared Good as a substance and made use of it practically, that is to say outside the realm of poetics. We know the properties of Good and its predicables that we may speak of it as having an existence, that Good has something to do with the minimizing of harm (the property of non-maleficence), and also has to do with the positive presence of a desirable outcome (beneficence), desirable especially for the most reasoned of figures whose duty is to ensure an outcome that is must fecund to its dependents and also least harmful. That is where we obtain the principle of paternalism and also the definite order of hierarchy, this behavior being ontologically present in the natural sphere and the human political dome (which seems to be the logical conclusion of a human nature). It is the state being accorded its powers that has been thought to have the best understanding of managing resources and diplomacy that it can also vest its officials also according to how well these individually bring about the good of the nation to its constituents. Though neither they nor their ways are immediately popular, the aristocrats (or for its original meaning, the epistocrats) have legitimate power insofar as they are much like guardians compared to their constituents, as Plato speaks of. It was evident from this that whosoever shall be in charge of making decisions must have a knowledge as wide as possible of all the data sets through experience both within this dutiful post and also as an individual, since by this side effects may be averted; this is also made evident in computer programming where undesired modifications (side effects) are best averted at compile time by limiting corresponding index scopes. It is from this notion that we have a hierarchy within the family where the parents are above the children, their counsel being an ornament about the child’s head. Since, the child by the scarcity of experience, which we can attribute to a short life and also an inchoate state of learning, is less likely to make the right decision insofar as its passions are unbridled and its perceived world a fraction of the whole, not yet reaching the age of reason and thus in a worse position to enact beneficence and non-maleficence all from the most simple act. It is also from this that we have notion of God being all-Good, since the first premise of His nature is that He is omniscient of all capabilities and thus also the means by which the most benefit is begot, that is to say the most fecund act, while being also unrestricted in His possibilities (ex omnipotens) that by virtue of simplicity the best order is obtained from the full domain of possible actions with the least amount of complexity, as Leibniz speaks of (Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics”, Liber V.).
It is from this knowledge and potentiality of Good for a subject that the substance of Love is begot; and the synthesis of Will is thus a requisite for Love, insofar as compromise or subservience is a requisite for Love, since it is the empathy which is necessary for the act to be most simple and without accident, which confounds the knowledge of the subject and its Will, converting it to an object. As in the words of Our Lady in the Annunciation, “Fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum”, which we may reply “Ecce ancilla Domini,” (Luke 1:38) since she has made perfect synthesis of her will with another, undesiring of any gain or self-fulfillment (if it was to occur after synthesis, it would be rendered a corollary object rather than the subject of action), seeking only the potentiality of Good for the subject. Yet, this in turn makes a passion of Love insofar as it may be directed towards either something noxious or salvific, since an agent may love the sabotage of another or the excess of eating and effectively synthesize his will with that of an inanimate object or the object of action for itself as a subject, utilizing his knowledge of what can bring about the more fulfilment of it (again by the analysis of beneficence and non-maleficence).
Regarding the faculties of Sensuality and Imagination, they are both corruptible corollaries of Love, passions that may be directed towards or against the subject that is to say. Sensuality is not a requisite of Love insofar as the synthesis of Will and reasoned potentiality of Good for another can be attained without the burning joy within the secrecy of the heart, and can counteractively diminish Love as the initial subject of it becomes secondary to the object of the Senses or Imagination which have since become the primary subject. For instance, it is not unheard of for an uninitiated mystic in their undiscernment to confound their Love of God with their Love of the ecstatic state, or a young lover to prefer the imagined spectre of his amante to her actuality. Though these corollaries can aid in the furthering of Love if the actual subject remains the focus, rather than an accident; since the agent can utilize the forces to more perfectly synthesize Wills. Such is seen in the disciplined mystic or poet who in the annealment of a meditation on the deeds and properties of the subject knows their Will more perfectly, and thus has the potentiality of directed Good increase and withal its predicable of Love.
Again, in regards to the knowledge of Good (beneficence and non-maleficence) of a subject being necessary for Love, it can not be said that a father performed an act out of Love if he was oblivious of the Good that would be brought upon his child upon enrolling the subject (his child) in a music conservatory, since the positive result in the child would effectively be an accident, a corollary to a will incongruent to that of his child. Though all that is required for Love to be begot of the substance of Good is potentiality rather than actuality, since an imperfect realization of a deed with an imperfectly performed analysis of beneficence and non-maleficence to a subject is still a synthesis of Will. For instance, a wife unknowing to the fact her husband despises painting, yet deducing from his observed behavior that it would do Good for him out of all possible actions, would be performing an act out of Love if she were to buy him a painting set, complete with brushes, a canvas, and rabbit-skin glue.
And more basically, evidently the presence of a Will is necessary for there to be Love since the faculty of Reason is a requisite for the analytical existence of Good, the genus which Love is a predicable of. It is for such reason that there is no property of desert in acts out of instinct, since the discernment of a prospect from good, better, to best is devolved to necessity since the alternative is implausible. Most tritely, it can not be said that the man incarcerated (without the possibility of escape) with a friend who he much adores, is in fact, remaining in the cell by his own volition (Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Liber II.), though it is most convenient for him to be amused. Death and displeasure is in itself contrary to the teleological beginning, and ideal of any living specimen, and it is thus the natural inclination of men, animals, and plants to follow a sort of hedonistic heuristic wherein the least pain is perceived and the most pleasure is conceived, though it is the faculty of Reason in men which elevate them above this base nature since they may disobey the inclination in martyrdom and the self-denial of asceticism, in preference of the permanent over the ephemeral, the grand over the base. It is for this reason that I assert that for a citizen to obey a law is rarely the product of Love for the nation but again the instinctive deployment of a heuristic which avoids pain and punishment and seeks recompense, though it is possible for a law to be observed in Love if the lucid Will of the agent is in full synthesis with the spirit of the law, the nation, or its initiator, since there is an empathetic analysis involving a variable besides the Self, essentially a survey of Reason detailing what would be good, better, or best for at least one subject.
There is something to be said that a synthesis of Will is unnecessary for an act out of Love, since perhaps the potentiality of Good is displeasing to the subject. For instance, in the role of paternalism, it is quite oft that the optimal potentiality of non-maleficence and beneficence is unknown to the subject and yet must be realized; such as scheduling a visit to the dentist, which horrifies the child to an unquelled fear and even hatred of his parents, but allays cavities and promotes his general well-being. I respond that such is still a synthesis of Will, though a synthesis of the agent’s will to the subject’s most reasonable and base desire to thrive, its telos, as Aristotle mentions. It is evident that there is no subject whose teleological ideal is self-destruction, it is rather eudaimonia (flourishing) which fulfills the subject’s course of beginning to fate. The immediate objection to my assertion is the case of those who in sorrow seek their death by their own hand, further those who in the same state wish nothing but their own harm, and famously the words of Augustine, “A depraved soul, falling away from security in thee to destruction istelf, seeking nothing from the shameful deed but shame itself.” (St. Augustine, “Confessions”, Liber II.) I will not be as those who dismiss this behavior as anomaly, removing it from the data set, but will rather assert that even self-destruction for its own sake is in its actuality the fulfilment of a form of noxious flourishing which pleases the human nature. There is a certain profound displeasure experienced by the human in impurity and ambiguity insofar as no assessment can be made of the situation. For instance, a recently divorced man, separated from his own children, will seek to reinforce what is now but an unpleasant notion of isolation to a definite state of being an outcast; thus he may now adopt purposefully unattractive behavior in order to alienate every subject in his social radius, that he may officially declare and know that he is a true outcast. This behavior is recognized as self-handicapping in medical literature, with its casualties “erect[ing] impediments to performance to protect their self-esteem” and has been found to be comorbid with reinforcing negative focus and withdrawal (M Zuckerman et. al J Pers Soc Psychol., “Consequences of self-handicapping: effects on coping, academic performance, and adjustment”, published in June 1998 by the National Library of Medicine).
Thus I conclude that such self-destructive behavior, since it seeks to protect self-esteem and seeks to appeal to the human requisite for closure, is in itself a misdirected and noxious predicable of the genus of eudaimonia. Though concerning whether it would be Love for an agent with accurate knowledge of the will of a self-handicapping subject to synthesize wills and act in order to harm or aid in the destruction of the subject, I reply that it would not be Love since it is less fecund in potentiality to effectively cauterize the ability to flourish permanently (by abetting in suicide), or encourage events which heavily impair the future potentiality of Good (or flourishing) in the subject, increasing the struggle for the subject in reestablishing order once in a lucid state. In essence, it is another case where the role of paternalism is the duty of the agent, since the subconscious will of the subject, when given, is the standard form of eudaimonia, and all that is negating its actuality is a problem of logistics, hence the agent must out of a subsidiary role aid in recovery.